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The United Kingdom’s Eurosceptic Political Economy 
Dr Chris Gifford  
 
Abstract 
 
This article explores how a political economy approach can explicate recent events in the 
United Kingdom’s relation to the European Union. The proposition is that neither critical nor 
comparative approaches do justice to the extent to which British elites have sought to 
differentiate the UK from the EU. The UK is here understood as a Eurosceptic political 
economy, constructed in opposition to European integration and, in particular, Economic and 
Monetary. The article explores how we have witnessed a hardening of this Eurosceptic 
political economy in the context of the Eurozone crisis. The most distinctive feature of which, 
as seen in the referendum campaign, is the extent to which the economic case for withdrawal 
has been established as part of the mainstream of British political debate. 
 
Introduction 
 
The ever more contested nature of European integration has brought Euroscepticism to the 
forefront of the study of the European Union (EU). Its shift from the margins of political 
systems to the mainstream of the politics of government, and opposition has reoriented 
research to its autonomous causal significance (Taggart and Szczerbia,k 2013; Usherwood 
and Startin, 2013). While research on Euroscepticism now extends beyond the party system to 
the media, civil society and political culture more widely, the concept has yet to be applied to 
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political economy (Tournier-Sol and Gifford, 2015). This is surprising, as its rise has 
generally been a direct response to the failings of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and 
the impact of austerity. In the case of the United Kingdom, while not a member of the 
Eurozone, the Eurozone crisis has undoubtedly impacted on domestic politics and contributed 
to the resurgence in right wing Euroscepticism. The leave/remain referendum has seen a 
radical right economic scenario enter mainstream political debate; a scenario in which the 
United Kingdom has a successful economic future outside of the EU. The idea that the United 
Kingdom could end its foremost economic relationship, one central to its post-imperial re-
orientation and recovery, is quite extraordinary. This paper argues that we have witnessed a 
persistent differentiation of the United Kingdom’s political economy from that of the 
Eurozone driven by an ideological Euroscepticism, the origins of which can be traced back to 
the forced withdrawal of the UK from the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) in 
1992.   
  
This article views Euroscepticism as constitutive of contemporary political economic 
processes and policy agendas. On this understanding, it is not simply an attitude or approach 
to policies emerging at the European level but contests the legitimacy of integration and a 
European polity (De Wilde and Trenz, 2012). It is associated with the construction of political 
identities in opposition to Europeanisation, mainly produced and reproduced by the practices 
of elites, populist movements and the mass media. We are therefore interested in 
Euroscepticism as an expression of the symbolic power of elites in producing a distinctive 
British political economy in opposition to European integration, which continues to naturalise 
national differentiation despite the realities of global and regional economic integration and 
interdependence. Hence, while established UK economic stakeholders and institutions may 
express their commitment to British membership of the EU in the referendum campaign, this 
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does not alter a political economy in which Euroscepticism has become hegemonic.   
  
This article critically engages with political economy approaches to the United Kingdom and 
European integration, focusing on neo-Gramscian, Open Marxist and comparative 
approaches.   In the case of critical political economy, this article proposes that conceptual 
frameworks, including depoliticisation, new constitutionalism and embedded neo-liberalism, 
are overextended.   In particular, the United Kingdom’s national neo-liberal differentiation 
from European developments is underexplored. Conversely, comparative approaches 
overstate and reify institutional differences, ignoring transnational economic integration and 
the contingent construction of political economic difference. These have failed to explain the 
continued differentiation between the political economy of the United Kingdom and the EU in 
a context of global economic integration.   Furthermore, it will be argued that the so-called 
Anglo-model of liberal capitalism should be understood not as a distinct national model, but 
in terms of its interdependence with global economic integration and change. Its institutions 
and elites are often reactive, and the United Kingdom’s political economy is constructed in 
relation to these external dynamics. The discussion will focus on how the United Kingdom’s 
recent political economic path has been constituted through its opposition to European 
integration, particularly in relation to EMU. This trajectory is explored from the Major 
government up until the 2016 referendum campaign. A populist, Eurosceptic political 
economic discourse will be shown to have taken hold across the mainstream of British 
politics.  This opens the space for a radical right challenge to the conventional position that 
the United Kingdom’s membership of the EU is in the national economic interest. For the 
foreseeable future, this represents the ‘constraining dissensus’, within which governing elites 
must engage with the EU (Hooghe and Marks, 2009). 
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European integration and critical political economy 
  
In a pivotal contribution, Stephen Gill (1998: 9) depicts the EU as ‘remaking state apparatuses 
and governmental practices and the institutions of civil society’ in ways compatible with neo-
liberalism. European integration is a powerful complex of processes stretching from system to 
social integration, successfully embedding and extending property rights, commodification 
and rentier interests and attitudes across European societies. Thus, Europe’s ‘new 
constitutionalism’ is viewed as ‘the political and legal reconstitution of capital through the 
agency of a neoliberal transnational historic bloc’ (Gill, 1998: 11). In this context, Gill 
referred to the United Kingdom as evidence of how the neo-liberal perspective is deeply 
political and engenders new forms of governance (Gill, 1998: 12). It emerges as the 
‘exemplar’ of a state that has reconfigured the relationship between the economic and 
political and acts as a template for new constitutionalism in Europe. Indeed, even though the 
UK remained outside of EMU, the neo-Gramscian literature on European integration suggests 
a comprehensive neo-liberal convergence between the United Kingdom and the EU. 
  
The dominance of the competitiveness discourse of transnational elites within the European 
Commission and key policy-making forums was of particular importance to new 
constitutionalism. Again the United Kingdom is central to these developments, Van 
Apeldoorn (2002: 80) noted how a European transnational neo-liberalism drew upon the 
‘(post-1979) British model of capitalism, in its ideological discourse, as generally appealing 
to Anglo-Saxon capitalism (that is including the USA) as the model for Europe’. Hence, 
whilst concessions to opposing models (neo-mercantalism and transnational social 
democracy) were evident, these were ‘more of a hegemonic strategy of incorporation that 
seeks to further the neo-liberal agenda than one that offers genuine prospects for a substantive 
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“embedding” of the new European market’ (Van Apeldoorn, 2000: 176).  One striking 
example of this ‘hegemonic incorporation’ identified in the literature has been the 
Europeanisation of the ‘Third Way’. Ryner (2010) has argued that European social 
democracy was powerfully influenced by New Labour and its combining of economic 
liberalisation with an ‘enabling’ welfare state. The Labour governments proved influential in 
proposing that the subordination of economic policy to financial imperatives could be made 
compatible with welfare states. From this view, they were fundamental to locking the EU into 
the structural dominance of US monetary policy, underpinned by an ‘organic alliance’ 
between US and EU elites (Cafruny and Ryner, 2007). Moreover, the full incorporation of 
Third Way European social democrats into this system meant that when the financial system 
went in to crisis in 2008, they were ‘so deeply imbricated with the system’ that they were ‘not 
in a position to offer an alternative’ (Ryner, 2010: 554). To view the United Kingdom-EU 
relationship from this perspective is therefore consistent with an understanding of European 
integration as a transnational re-organisation of class power in line with global restructuring. 
As such, neo-liberal globalisation is seen to have emanated from its epicentres in the United 
Kingdom and the United States, and penetrated European institutions. 
  
For many critics of European integration, the most significant expression of this transnational 
re-organisation of political authority has been the establishment of a legal order that enables a 
more effective disciplining of national working classes by nation states. In this regard, Open 
Marxists have argued that the ideological underpinnings of European integration reflected the 
free market right, in particular Hayek’s conception of supranationalism as an effective 
framework for de-politicising economic relations at the national level through legally 
protecting the freedom of capital above the nation-state (Bonefeld ,2002: 130). The deepening 
and widening of European integration since the 1980s is therefore best understood as 
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consistent with an intensification of the shift from politicised to depoliticised modes of 
economic management (Burnham, 2006: 99). The nationally institutionalised regulation of the 
working class is replaced by monetary orthodoxy and fiscal discipline at the European level in 
order to improve competitiveness at the expense of the jobs, wages and the social rights. 
  
The role of European integration in establishing depoliticised forms of economic governance 
has been explored in depth in relation to economic governance in the United Kingdom in the 
1990s (inter alia Bonefeld and Burnham, 1998). For Open Marxists, UK membership of the 
ERM enabled the Major government to control wage inflation and discipline labour while 
distancing itself from the political implications.  Post-ERM, the United Kingdom mirrored the 
Eurozone in its rule-based framework for economic management that emphasized price 
stability, rules on public expenditure and central bank control, albeit allowing for more 
flexibility than EMU (Burham, 2001, 2006). For Burnham, membership of EMU was the 
logical next step for deepening the politics of depoliticisation in the United Kingdom. 
However, he also acknowledged the political constraints in achieving this: ‘it is perhaps a step 
too far for the British electorate’ (Burnham, 2001: 146). 
  
Open Marxist and neo-Gramscian approaches point to global capitalist relations, whether 
processed nationally or transnationally, as the driving force behind the construction of 
depoliticised neo-liberal arrangements in which the United Kingdom has been fully 
implicated, if not taken a leadership role within. Nevertheless, the extent to which the United 
Kingdom has been persistently differentiating itself from the process of integration, 
promoting a unique political economic project that is essentially non-Europeanised, is 
therefore theoretically closed off. The United Kingdom, when understood as a highly 
differentiated Eurosceptic political economy, is not considered but subsumed with the wider 
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structural logic of global capital.  
  
European integration and comparative political economy 
 
Comparative political economy challenges, both theoretically and empirically, the 
extensiveness of economic globalisation and the dominance of disciplinary neo-liberalism. 
The overriding concern of these approaches has been to demonstrate the continuities and re-
assertions of territorial power to control capital in line with a state’s interest (Hirst and 
Thompson, 1999). New institutionalism, in particular, has focussed upon the ways in which 
economic processes and pressures are mediated by the comparative specificity of state 
structures and contextualised political agency (Garrett, 1998; Hall and Soskice 2001; Hay, 
2004).   
  
Comparativism opens up a very different understanding of European integration from critical 
political economy by demonstrating how national models of regulated capitalism are extended 
and protected by European integration. On this reading, European institutional governance 
represents a powerful example of how states are able to coordinate action and maintain 
autonomy in contexts of increased international openness (Hirst and Thompson, 1999). As 
such, there is clearly a sociological problem with the over extension of the hegemony of 
transnational neo-liberalism, as extended market instrumentalism generates demands for rules 
and value systems that can support stable and meaningful action and provide protection from 
risk within a territory (Hirst and Thompson, 1999, 278; Radice, 2000, 722). It has been 
argued that there is nothing inherently neo-liberal about the development of the EU as a legal 
order, and that its constitutional settlement remains profoundly contested (Parker, 2008; 
Strange, 2006;). EMU, in particular, has been viewed as embodying the EU’s neo-liberal 
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trajectory with its emphasis on price stability and public sector borrowing restraint. Yet, 
viewed largely as a German-dominated initiative, it is consistent with the ordoliberal tradition 
of monetary stability and low inflation overseen by an independent central bank and a state 
which does not engage in demand management. A more regulated Europe with a single 
currency and common monetary policy was seen as essential to protecting the German model, 
which viewed currency fluctuations and extensive competitive deregulation as a major threat 
to its economic strength and stability (Fioretes, 2001). 
  
Emphasising that ‘varieties of capitalism’ are reproduced within the process of European 
integration qualifies its reduction to disciplinary neo-liberalism and empirically demonstrates 
the contested and changing nature of the EU’s political economy. Moreover, on this view, the 
United Kingdom’s more extensive form of neo-liberalisation is potentially divergent from the 
coordinated market approach of core European states, which is reflected in the EU as a 
regulatory polity. However, the focus on the United Kingdom as a political economic 
outsider, institutionally divergent and disadvantaged within the EU, is problematic when 
capitalism is understood as a space of flows that subverts territorial containment. In his 
critical, but not unsympathetic, reading of the comparativist oeuvre, Radice (2000: 736) 
argues that globalisation does not mean ‘that the nation-state is being undermined….but 
rather that the transnational dimension of the state has become more salient as a result of 
wider and deeper cross-border economic activity’. At issue is the extent to which approaches 
that focus upon the spatial differentiation of political economies can theoretically address 
common systemic processes, no matter how differently they may be mediated.  
  
Contemporary economic globalisation is here understood as financially engineered fluid and 
open markets, not seen since the end of the 19th century, and the global intensification of 
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geographical competition to attract and to retain capital (Arrighi, 1994, 1999; Harvey, 2003, 
2010). The transformative capacity of global economic process will depend upon how they 
are mediated by, and grounded within, institutions, alongside how the hegemonic forces of 
globalisation are manifesting themselves at any particular time.  However, whatever way we 
look at it, the contemporary formation of political economic spaces occurs through 
interactions and entwinements with the restructurings of the global system. On the one hand it 
is important not to reduce the EU to neo-liberal globalisation, and on the other, neither should 
its capacity to act as a regional buffer be overstated. The organisation of the EU as a political 
economic space has been concomitant with its openness to the global economy and therefore 
is most accurately defined as open regionalism (Baker et al., 2002: 413-415). On this view, 
while it has certainly mediated globalisation, the intense volatility of global capital 
accumulation has, at the very least, seriously challenged its institutional competencies, 
profoundly demonstrated by the impact of the financial crisis on the Eurozone and the 
divisiveness of the response (Dyson, 2010). If the EU attempts to mediate the relationship of 
European states to globalisation, then in the case of the UK globalisation mediates its 
relationship to the EU. It has had a more direct relation to the processes of global 
restructuring, and has eschewed European territorialism.  The United Kingdom should first 
and foremost be viewed as a global political economic order and its trajectory as a ‘European 
state’ can only be understood in relation to this primary materialisation. 
  
The Anglo-model in global perspective 
  
It is important to recognise that the United Kingdom’s divergence from the EU reflects a 
national neo-liberal trajectory that precedes the integrationist dynamic of the 1980s and 
1990s. In 1976, the year after the British people had voted in favour of membership of the 
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European Community, the United Kingdom was co-opted, through International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) intervention, into the Washington Consensus, and the management of the 
international accumulation crisis through accelerating financialisation (Panitch, 2000). The 
domestic consequences were the abandoning of the Labour government’s social democratic 
electoral commitments, the introduction of stringent public sector cuts and the privatisation of 
British Petroleum. The election of the Thatcher government in 1979 resulted in the immediate 
removal of capital controls, and in 1986, deregulation opened up the City to foreign banks and 
securities firms. While European integration enabled member-states to free themselves from 
domestic political constraints, this was less important for the United Kingdom because of its 
earlier neo-liberal transformation and an economy that was already highly globalised (Hirst 
and Thompson, 2000). While the United Kingdom’s period as global hegemon had ended 
during the first half of the 20th century, it retained the institutions that were associated with 
being a world financier and proved highly significant in continuing the intensity of global 
economic integration.  From the late 1950s onwards, London became the financial gateway to 
Europe for large quantities of dollars from the profits of US multinationals that headed 
offshore in order to avoid tax and regulation. There was a sudden growth in these markets 
between 1968 and 1973, followed by 20 years of further growth, during the period in which 
the dollar was allowed to float (Hobsbawm, 1995: 278; Arrighi, 1999: 237). Arrighi (1999: 
237) points out that by the mid 1970s, ‘the volume of purely monetary transactions carried 
out in offshore money markets already exceeded the value of world trade many times over’. 
And it was the United Kingdom, more precisely London, that found itself at the centre of this 
denationalisation of capital.  While the United Kingdom entered a post-imperial period 
characterised by relative economic and absolute geopolitical decline, the City had adapted and 
was well positioned to benefit from the financialisation of the global economy.  By the mid 
1990s, the UK banking sector showed a ‘remarkable and exceptional degree of exposure to 
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internationalisation’ and UK citizens’ household wealth was twice as likely to be 
internationalised as most other advanced economies (Hirst and Thompson, 2000: 347-348). 
 Regional integration has been a central feature of this, with the establishment of the City of 
London as the European financial centre managing billions of Euros for EU public and private 
sectors. 
  
What characterises the United Kingdom’s financial and business model is its role as an open 
and fluid site of transnational integration. European business and finance move into and 
through the United Kingdom precisely because of the opportunities it creates for access to 
global markets. London’s role as a world financial centre is built upon its capacity, 
particularly when compared to its European counterparts, to de-territorialise capital. Hence, 
we are dealing with a distinct multi-level political economic order in which the national, the 
regional and the global intersect, and dissect, rather than manifest as distinctly ‘European’ or 
‘British’.  
 
From this perspective, the idea of a distinct Anglo model of national capitalism is a product of 
a path dependency combined with global economic change, as much as it is the outcome of 
the agency of political elites and government strategies. Maximising capital’s global capacity 
to enter and exit has become a key function of the UK state.  In addition, governments have 
sought to translate private market strategies into public policy. The United Kingdom 
pioneered supplementing neo-liberalism by privatised Keynesianism, in which the problem of 
sustaining domestic demand in advanced economies appeared to have been solved by the 
dramatic expansion of credit markets to those on low and middle incomes and derivatives and 
futures markets for the wealthy (Crouch, 2009: 390).  What initially occurred by chance and 
market entrepreneurship was translated into public policy, especially seen in the support for 
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rising house prices.   
 
The Anglo model has been constituted through the opportunistic and reactive actions of elites, 
within a specific experience of global structural conditions. In this context, political coherence 
has relied upon British governing institutions that include a particularly powerful executive 
and treasury. In symbolic terms, both Labour and Conservative governments have retained a 
strong commitment to a traditional British nation-state, of which Euroscepticism has become 
an established part (Daddow, 2013; Gifford, 2014a).  
 
From the perspective of this article, what is striking is the extent to which the Anglo model of 
political economy has been ideologically reproduced in opposition to the territorial logic of 
European integration. It is the form of this opposition that has become ever more domestically 
contested. In the referendum campaign, the central political divide has not been between 
Europeanists, proponents of integration, and Eurosceptics, but between those who consider 
that British power, and its neo-liberal political economy, is augmented by opposition from 
within the EU or those who advocate complete withdrawal.   
 
 
  
Constituting the UK’s Eurosceptic political economy 
  
EMU has been fundamental to fashioning the United Kingdom’s recent relationship to the EU 
and its Eurosceptic political economy. Just as British governments in the 1950s were 
consistently behind the curve when it came to the drive for integration, so recent governments 
have struggled to adjust to EMU. The failure of the Thatcher and Major governments to 
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undermine or influence the direction of EMU demonstrated the profound limits of British 
influence.  While Major presented Maastricht as a victory, it demonstrated that the United 
Kingdom was far from being at the ‘heart of Europe’ and had been marginalised in the face of 
the drive for further integration. This became evident following the Maastricht Treaty and 
British withdrawal from the ERM. The belief grew that the United Kingdom had lost out in 
the Maastricht negotiations to Germany, as it failed to stop or influence the direction of EMU 
and to win over others to its alternative of a hard European Currency Unit (ECU), a proposal 
originating in the City for a hard currency dependent on the market rather than institutions for 
its validity (Dyson, 2000: 903). Conversely, EMU meant a Bundesbank-shaped system that 
could threaten UK advantage in European financial markets and the City’s international 
competitiveness. Outside of EMU, the fear was that new Euro products and markets would 
gravitate to Frankfurt, while on the inside, the concern was that the competitive advantage of 
London in global markets would be undermined by ‘continental style’ regulation. As City 
criticisms of EMU mounted, so political support more broadly for ERM membership waned. 
On this view, the attacks on sterling and its withdrawal from the ERM were not simply a 
consequence of economic decisions (an over-valued pound, high interest rates in Germany), 
but arguably reflected a loss of confidence in the government because of its failure to exert 
influence during the Maastricht negotiations. Following withdrawal from the ERM, the 
British government claimed that the whole project of EMU was flawed and should be 
renegotiated (Major, 1993).  Moreover, ERM exit was a victory for those who argued that 
economic stability was best achieved through domestic mechanisms rather than external 
disciplines. Norman Lamont, as Chancellor, put in place a system of inflation targeting and 
regular meetings with the Governor of the Bank of England to discuss interest rates, a set of 
reforms that lay the foundations for Bank independence in 1997.  
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Maastricht and the ERM crisis was highly significant in establishing the contemporary British 
governing position towards the EU: that the stakes are high in terms of British economic 
interests but the direction of integration is profoundly flawed, a potential threat to those 
interests and British influence is difficult to secure. Underlying the approach of British 
governments to EMU was a non-Europeanised Whitehall, and, in particular, a Treasury 
acutely sensitive to the financial markets and to the United States, the leading player in those 
markets (Dyson, 2000: 902-903).  The Treasury viewed EMU with a combination of caution 
and scepticism and secured a veto over any decision about entry. Nevertheless, the national 
economic interest case was also hardened by Maastricht: a British government could not risk 
the possibility that the City and big business would be excluded or discriminated against in 
European markets. The post-Maastricht dilemma was how to maintain the confidence of core 
economic stakeholders, secure British influence yet without being drawn into arrangements 
considered threatening both economically and politically. 
 
New Labour and Anglo-Europe  
 
The solution to the United Kingdom’s position outside of the Eurozone was the discursive 
construction of the ‘other’ EU, a British vision of an Anglicised Europe. The conceit that 
through British led reform, the EU would come to its senses and align with the United 
Kingdom. Hence, the national economic interest became framed within the projection of 
Anglo-Europe.   Not only would UK governments defend economic interests but they would 
construct an EU that was as neo-liberal as the British model, resisting an overregulated single 
market and a protectionist Eurozone. Significantly, the value dimensions of the European 
project did not need to be imported into British politics and society because British values 
could be successfully exported to the EU.  The British position was that the success of EMU 
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depended on the wider reform of the European economy not on more political integration. 
EMU should be underpinned by competitive deregulation of national economies, creating the 
flexibility necessary to compete effectively in the global economy. This was the basis on 
which a policy of constructive engagement with EMU was to be taken forward (Dyson, 2000: 
911). This began to take shape as the Major government attempted to craft a European 
strategy following the Eurosceptic rebellions over Maastricht and ERM withdrawal. Hugo 
Young (1998: 450-451) recalled interviewing Douglas Hurd between 1992 and 1996, who 
argued repeatedly that Europe was ‘moving our way’. From Hurd’s perspective, conservative 
differences between Eurosceptics and pro-Europeans no longer mattered as the EU converged 
in favour of market liberalisation and subsidiarity rather than social regulation and 
centralisation. 
 
There was a justifiable economic basis for this argument in that the United Kingdom was in a 
strong position to benefit from European financial deregulation. The liberalisation of the 
banking system undermined an oligopolistic, often state-sponsored, structure and introduced 
highly competitive credit relations with minimal regulation (Grahl, 1997: 177). Moreover, the 
restructuring and global integration of European financial markets and institutions was a 
direct result of a large body of European legislation associated with the completion of the 
single market. In this context, EMU became less a threat than an opportunity for the United 
Kingdom’s financial sector. By the time of the introduction of the Euro in 1999, the City was 
well prepared for its introduction  (Dyson, 2000: 905). At the turn of the century it was 
handling more international euro-denominated transactions than Frankfurt and Paris 
combined (Kynaston, 2002: 785). 
  
The possibility of uniting the Conservative party around a neo-liberal vision of the EU eluded 
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the Major leadership, which was undone by the divisions unleashed by Maastricht.  
Conversely, the coming to power of New Labour under the Blair/Brown leadership resulted in 
a more fully articulated Anglo-European vision. The official position of the government was 
to ‘prepare and decide’ over EMU, without setting a date and subjecting membership to the 
Treasury’s five economic tests. Nevertheless, rather than aligning the British economy with 
the Eurozone, there was continued emphasis on structural reforms in other member-states, and 
that EMU membership could not be separated from a wider programme of EU modernisation. 
This met with some success. The Lisbon summit in 2000 seemed to confirm the 
Europeanisation of Labour’s Third Way with its proposals for reforms of the European Social 
Model in line with the priorities of economic competitiveness, liberalised financial markets 
and a knowledge-based economy. Notably, the Market in Financial Instruments Directive, 
which came out of the Financial Services Action Plan agreed at Lisbon, established the 
principle of maximum harmonisation, limiting the capacity of national governments to 
augment European legislation with their own rules.   
 
Nevertheless, the Labour government grew increasingly concerned that the Commission 
wanted to over regulate finance. On countering this, Ed Balls summarised the government’s 
success in a speech in 2006: 
…our system of light-touch and risk-based regulation is regularly cited…. as one of 
our chief attractions. It has provided us with a huge competitive advantage and is 
regarded as the best in the world. Second, we have fought off proposals in Europe 
which would have undermined London’s standing as the leading global financial 
centre. (Balls, 2006) 
  
Balls’ trumpeting of the United Kingdom’s financial liberalisation agenda was indicative of 
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the approach to European integration that was emanating from the British Treasury at the 
time. In this respect, the lead was coming from Gordon Brown who was not focussed on 
presenting the United Kingdom as a potential partner in EMU, but as a political economic 
model to be followed. Brown’s review of the single currency tests took place at the pinnacle 
of his chancellorship, having achieved credibility with the markets as well as considerable 
public trust. His rejection of the Euro was concomitant with his proselytising for the British 
way and his critique of the EU’s response to globalisation.   In 2003, he argued that the 
United Kingdom was outperforming other major economies because of the success of New 
Labour’s uniquely British approach to the economy, providing a model from which other 
states could learn: ‘our British values -what we say and do marrying enterprise and fairness, 
and about public services and the need to relieve poverty, can and should, in time, make 
Britain a model, a beacon for Europe, America and the rest of the world’ (Brown, 2003c). 
Indeed he claimed that ‘Europe’s institutions are having to be reshaped in line with long-held 
British values – internationalism, enterprise, fairness, political accountability’ (Brown, 
2003a). Its ‘old flawed assumptions’ characterised by inexorable moves towards federalism 
were challenged by the success of the British model (Brown, 2003b). According to Brown 
(2005: 8), globalisation entirely changed ‘the context for European integration. A Europe 
whose first goals were internal integration and harmonisation, and whose economic focus has 
long been inward looking, now needs to rise to the challenges of the new global economy’. 
Evidently it was Britain’s mix of flexibility, fairness and macroeconomic stability that 
provided the blueprint for the EU as a whole.   
 
Central to Brown’s model of political economy were London’s liberalised financial markets 
(Lee 2009: 24). Brown (2004) told the City, ‘what you have achieved for the financial 
services sector, we as a country now aspire to achieve for the whole of the British economy’. 
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Globally, integrated financial markets had provided the basis for the massive extension of 
private debt that underpinned consumer driven growth. The apotheosis of which were highly 
securitised mortgage markets that fuelled rapid increases in house prices. Meanwhile, the high 
tax revenues from financial services were proving essential for increased spending on public 
services (Darling, 2011: 22) 
 
As the Brown model of economic governance was consolidated, a ‘subtle policy of 
retrenchment’ towards the Eurozone and its institutions took hold at the Treasury (Buller and 
Gamble, 2008: 261). There was particular concern over the amount of power that had been 
ceded to the European Central Bank in that, in comparison to the Bank of England, it had 
‘goal’ as well as ‘operational’ independence, meaning it could set its own inflation rate at 
which interest rate adjustments may be necessary. In comparison, the British government 
retained control over the target, which was symmetrical so that intervention was required to 
address deflation as well as inflation. In addition, by setting the parameters of fiscal targets 
over the full length of the economic cycle, the government retained sufficient autonomy to 
overshoot when growth was lower than expected and to undershoot during the ‘good’ times 
(Strange, 2014). Conversely, EMU was considered to lock governments into annual debt 
targets that considerably reduced their room to manoeuvre. Strange (2014: 150) concluded 
that underlying New Labour’s decision not join EMU were core macroeconomic policy 
differences. The government’s economic ‘rules’ offered greater flexibility over monetary and 
fiscal policy than was possible under EMU, reflecting New Labour’s commitment to a 
Keynesian economic policy and social democratic objectives. As such, EMU was too neo-
liberal and overly constrained macroeconomic discretion. New Labour combined a neo-liberal 
emphasis on the globalisation and financialisation of the UK economy with a mix of private 
and public Keynesianism in an attempt, ultimately unsuccessful, to stabilise a volatile and 
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crisis prone economic model. Nevertheless, the belief that EMU was dependent on the further 
liberalisation and global openness of European economies demonstrated continuity with 
previous governments. In this regard, engagement with EMU was from a position of national 
autonomy and superiority; if the UK were to countenance joining EMU, the EU would need 
to undertake the necessary structural reforms to align with the United Kingdom.  
 
From Anglo-Europe to Brexit? 
 
If EMU had been presented by British elites as in need of reform, with the onset of the 
Eurozone crisis the tone shifted to one that emphasised its failure. By the time the Coalition 
was in place, the Eurozone was firmly positioned as a threat to British recovery, and a 
warning of what might happen if public spending was not brought under control. In the run up 
to the election, David Cameron had pointed out that, ‘this year, actually, we are borrowing 
more as a percentage of GDP than the Greeks are … Greece stands as a warning to what 
happens if you don’t pay back your debts’ (Cameron, 2010). During the Coalition 
negotiations, Sir Gus O’Donnell, the Cabinet Secretary, made it clear that the markets would 
expect a comprehensive agreement, or contagion could spread from Greece to the United 
Kingdom (House of Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, 2011: Ev. 4). 
The Conservative position on the Euro was ‘never’, and the Liberal Democrats had ruled it 
out for the duration of the parliament. A new phase in Britain’s Eurosceptic political economy 
had begun. 
  
There were two dimensions to the intensification of political economic Euroscepticism. First, 
the governing elite began to actively distance itself from the crisis in the Eurozone, and, 
second, it emphasised the need to protect the national interest from the threat of further 
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Eurozone integration. The mobilisation of Eurosceptics within the Conservative 
parliamentary party, and the sudden emergence of UK Independence Party (UKIP) as a 
serious political contender, meant these developments were now firmly located within the 
febrile politics of domestic Euroscepticism. In the first year of the Coalition, there was 
mounting opposition from Eurosceptic Conservative Members of the Parliament (MPs) to 
bailouts of the Eurozone under the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM).  
George Osborne resisted being drawn into any further British contributions, opting for a 
bilateral loan in the case of Ireland, and blaming the previous Labour government for existing 
commitments. On the possibility of a banking union, Osborne (2012) invoked the British 
people, stating that, ‘..we are clear that Britain will not take part. British taxpayers will not 
stand behind Eurozone banks, and British voters want their government to be in charge of 
supervising our own banks, especially in a crisis’. Cameron and Osborne’s narrative 
combined an emphasis on the necessity of much greater Eurozone integration for the stability 
of the UK economy, with the potential threat that this could pose. The fear was that 
integration driven forward by the Eurozone countries would overwhelm the interests of the 
non-Eurozone countries. In particular, Qualified Majority Voting would allow the Eurozone 
countries to ‘bloc vote’ and operate as a protectionist grouping inside the EU.  
  
The following were the main concerns of the UK government during the negotiations on a 
fiscal pact in the December 2011 meeting of the European Council: British demands centered 
on unanimity on any transfer of powers from the national to the European level over financial 
supervision; any proposals that would require maximum harmonisation and prevent member 
states from imposing additional requirements such as higher capital requirements on banks; 
the fiscal interests of member-states over the imposition of taxes levies such as a European 
tax on financial transactions; and the provision that any European Supervisory Authority 
 21 
should not replace national authorities. That the concerns of the financial sector were 
therefore at the heart of the United Kingdom’s agenda demonstrated the key role of the 
Treasury in formulating the negotiating position. The government did not look to secure opt 
outs as there was no agreement on the table to opt out of, but sought to future protect the 
national interest against what it perceived to be the risk from Eurozone integration. In this, 
there was an implicit repatriation agenda, as in attempting to establish a principle of 
unanimity over financial services, it fundamentally challenged the use of Qualified Majority 
Voting in areas to do with the single market. Unsurprisingly, therefore, Manuel Barroso, the 
then President of the European Commission, described the British demands as a ‘risk to the 
integrity of the internal market’ (The Guardian, 2011). 
  
In the context of the drive for further integration, it is possible to argue that the veto of the 
fiscal pact was an example of a pragmatic Euro-realism, an emerging consensus summed up 
by Angela Merkel in terms of: ‘we don’t have to do everything in Brussels’ (Kirkup, 2013). 
Nevertheless, in vetoing the final agreement, the United Kingdom was clearly out of step with 
its European partners. Moreover, it was a significant change in policy on the part of the 
government from its predecessors.  Rather than staying at the negotiating table and securing 
British opt outs, the United Kingdom had not prevented the treaty going ahead, and allowed 
itself to be excluded from future negotiations, although it should be noted that the Coalition 
government continued to be engaged in successive agreements on banking supervision and 
secured several UK objectives including limiting Eurozone dominance of the new European 
Banking Authority. Pragmatics aside, the extent to which Cameron was lauded by the 
Conservative party on his return, followed by a noticeable improvement in the party’s poll 
rating, demonstrated the symbolic importance of the veto in domestic politics. It was 
recognised for what it was, an overt expression of national sovereignty. The popularity of the 
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veto paved the way for Cameron and Osborne to blame the Eurozone for the United 
Kingdom’s continued recession in 2012.  In sum, the Eurozone was a failure and a threat to 
the British recovery, Conservative scepticism towards EMU had been right all along and, 
while it must now resolve its problems by following the ‘remorseless logic’ of full EMU, it 
could not be trusted to do so in ways that would not threaten the United Kingdom’s national 
interests. For hard Eurosceptics, continued British membership meant being ‘shackled to a 
corpse’ (Mason, 2012).  
  
In his Bloomberg Speech in January 2013, Cameron attempted to locate this policy shift 
within a wider narrative of Britain’s relationship with European integration. He presented a 
British vision of ‘a flexible union of free member states’, counter-posed to those states that 
wanted ‘closer economic and political integration’, which Britain would ‘never embrace’ 
(Cameron, 2013). Nevertheless, he emphasised that his vision was pan-European, concerned 
with creating a ‘new’ EU fit for the ‘21st century’. In so doing, he rehearsed traditional 
British themes: an intergovernmental, variable EU principally concerned with further 
liberalisation and globalisation of the single market. However, he raised the stakes in 
promising a referendum on membership, implying that ‘the people’ would only want to stay 
in a EU reformed along British lines. In so doing, Cameron embraced Euroscepticism’s 
populist turn (Gifford, 2014b).   The threat of Eurozone integration was not simply to be 
addressed through the normal institutional mechanisms, but was to be countered by the 
invocation of sovereignty and ‘the people’. Coming centre stage were categories that 
governing elites had mostly attempted to avoid in the politics of European integration because 
of their exclusive connotations, preferring the more flexible notion of the national interest. 
  
This increasingly hard Eurosceptic discourse positioned EMU as antithetical to the UK’s 
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future. Moreover, EMU’s integrationist dynamic was more dangerous than ever. Yet, this was 
not presented as a UK-centric problem, as the collective interests of the non-Eurozone 
members were at stake. Nevertheless, from the British perspective it had a specific meaning 
which was preventing the Eurogroup from caucusing ‘together to impose financial services 
legislation on the United Kingdom’ (Osborne, 2014).   
  
One consequence of Cameron and Osborne’s thorough discrediting of the Eurozone, and its 
representation as a significant threat to the UK’s economy, was to expose a key tenet of the 
governing position towards European integration -; the naturalisation of the economic case for 
UK’s membership. Exit became a legitimate political economic position. In a live television 
debate between UKIP leader, Nigel Farage, and the then Deputy Prime Minister, Nick Clegg, 
Farage challenged Clegg’s claim that leaving the EU would be economically disastrous, 
arguing that the United Kingdom would be in a position to make its own trade agreements 
with emerging economies. A customs union he claimed was a 19th-century concept, in the 
context of globalization, ‘let’s open ourselves up for a bigger 21st century world’ (The BBC, 
2014). In arguing that there was a serious economic alternative to the EU, Farage cited Nigel 
Lawson, Chancellor under Margaret Thatcher. Lawson was one of a number of heavyweight 
Conservative politicians, including Michael Portillo and Boris Johnson, who challenged the 
established view that exit would be an economic disaster for the United Kingdom. The most 
telling argument made by Lawson was his reversal of the arguments of the 1960s and 1970s 
that were made for entry of Britain into the Community: 
  
 Today too much of British business and industry feels…secure in the warm 
embrace of the European single market and is failing to recognise that today's great 
export opportunities lie in the developing world, particularly in Asia. Just as entry 
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into the Common Market half a century ago provided a much needed change of 
focus, so might leaving the EU, an institution that has achieved its historic purpose 
and is now past its sell-by date, provide a much needed change of focus today. 
(Lawson, 2013) 
  
Ian Mansfield (2014), Director of Trade and Investment at the British embassy in the 
Philippines, fleshed out this agenda on British exit. In his view, Britain would leave the EU 
and rejoin European Free Trade Association (EFTA), in turn, it would negotiate a series of 
free trade agreements with emerging economic powers and the United States. The overall 
vision, both politically and economically, was one of global openness against European 
narrowness. While at that point still backing the Cameron position, on the back of a report 
published by Gerard Lyons, the Mayor’s Chief Economic Advisor, Johnson (2014) made a 
similar case for exit: ‘that combination of a lower regulatory burden and undiminished trade 
access would cause exports to boom, and the whole thing would be turbo-charged by new 
trading agreements with major partners such as China, Brazil, Russia, Australia and India’. 
By 2014, the economic arguments for UK exit had sharpened considerably, coalescing around 
the possibility of bilateral free trade agreements extending and intensifying the United 
Kingdom’s global reach. However, the main economic stakeholders, such as the 
Confederation of British Industry (CBI) and the financial lobby group, TheCityUK, remained 
strongly opposed. In the case of the City, the difficulty for the exiters was that it was more 
Europeanised than any other sector of the British economy, having successfully established 
itself as the financial centre of the Eurozone, a position that was built on EU internal market 
legislation. Neither was this in tension with its capacity to attract new business from outside 
of Europe, evidenced by the increased role in the Chinese offshore currency market. Business 
and finance have articulated a quite traditional British position that combined scepticism 
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towards the EU’s regulatory ambitions with a strong commitment to membership and to the 
importance of securing British influence.   
  
The referendum campaign has seen a nexus of establishment economic interests and 
institutions lining up in support of continued membership with strong support for the 
Cameron reform agenda, which aims to protect British interests outside of the Eurozone and 
promotes a flexible, globalised EU. The difficulty is that the Conservative leadership has 
augmented an established governing position, the United Kingdom as neo-liberal policy 
pioneer supporting the extension of the single market and resisting European regulation, by a 
populist Eurosceptic agenda.  In the context of a critical and discredited Eurozone, Cameron 
raised expectations that integration could be unravelled and power returned to the British 
people. Political economic differentiation is firmly locked into a more fundamental opposition 
to core aspects of the integration process and the national economic interest has become 
interconnected with a populist Euroscepticism.  As such the Cameron reform agenda had to 
deliver a blow to the core values of integration for domestic Eurosceptic audiences, whilst 
dependent on EU supranational institutions and the member-states being complicit in this. 
The awkwardness of the compromise was most clearly evident in the emergency break on 
benefits for EU migrants in the United Kingdom, which challenged but ultimately left intact 
the fundamental principle of free movement. The reform deal was predictably dismissed as a 
sham by Eurosceptics and virulently attacked across the press.  
 
The Cameron reform process illustrated the limitations of the EU in addressing powerful 
nationalist agendas driven by Euroscepticism within domestic politics. European elite 
compromises will always look weak when judged against essentialist and populist political 
criteria and constructs. However, while notions of indivisible sovereignty and traditional ideas 
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of nationhood have proved ideologically potent in the post-imperial context, they have 
seemed incompatible with the realities of governing in a context of regional and global 
integration.  The possibility of a viable political economic project that at the same time can 
‘reclaim’ sovereignty for the British people is undoubtedly compelling for many in UK 
politics, both left and right. Significantly, many of those who favour exit have framed their 
arguments in terms of the long-term interests of the British economy, often against what are 
considered to be the short-term concerns of ‘big business’.  Europe is presented as in crisis 
and decline, and the progressive case for withdrawal is made on the basis of the opportunities 
it provides for the United Kingdom to negotiate new trading arrangements and partnerships 
across the world (Gove, 2016; Johnson, 2016). The United Kingdom is repackaged as a 
flexible and autonomous nation-state open to the world, while, conversely, the EU ‘is an 
analogue union in a digital age’ (Gove, 2016). The attempt to position exit as on the extremes 
of British politics, as blinkered, reactionary and inward-looking nationalism, a strategy which 
had proved successful in past, no longer looks feasible. The referendum campaign has seen 
positions once on the margins firmly enter the mainstream of British political debate and, in 
so doing, a core governing tenet of post-imperial Britain, that membership of Europe is 
fundamental to the national economic interest, has faced its most significant challenge to date.  
 
Conclusion 
  
The article began by arguing that the dominant political economic approaches do not explain 
the relationship of the UK to the EU. Neither neo-liberal convergence nor institutional 
divergence sufficiently captures the extent to which the United Kingdom is differentiated as a 
political economy within a context of global and regional integration.  The article has 
proposed that this is in part reproduced by the persistent differentiation of the United 
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Kingdom from the Eurozone by British elites. Since the project of EMU was launched, elites 
have constructed the United Kingdom as a distinctive Eurosceptic political economy. This has 
only been possible because it has been considered to be in line with core economic interests in 
the United Kingdom. Positioning themselves as outsiders, as neo-liberal pioneers, British 
governments have endeavored to be seen as the most business friendly member-state.  
However, it has been argued that the construction of a Eurosceptic political economy has now 
taken a populist turn, with those favouring exit claiming that the EU is no longer in the longer 
term economic interests of the British people and incompatible with notions of sovereignty 
and autonomous nationhood. The future lies in flexible sovereign states, responsive to the 
challenges and opportunities of the global economy and solely accountable to national 
citizenries.  The viability of such a project may be questionable, but for it to enter the realms 
of political possibility is testament to its success.  
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